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During the  1980s, economic  disruptions  in several key  industries
have increased  financial stress in many parts of rural America.  Dif-
ficulties  in mining  and energy extraction,  import-competing  manu-
facturing  and  agriculture  have  combined  to raise the  rural unem-
ployment  rate  above  the  metro  rate,  a reversal  of what  happened
during much of the 1970s.  Job creation in rural areas has been much
slower than  in metro  areas, contributing  to a net out-migration  of
632,000 people in 1985-86 after an annual average net in-migration
during the 1970s.
Agriculture's  problems  have  played  a part-small  nationally,  but
large in some regions-in the rural stresses of the 1980s. Farm com-
modity programs have been at the hub of the debate over the cause of
agriculture's slowdown and in the proposed remedies for future farm
and rural growth.  The $26  billion in federal  spending on farm pro-
grams in FY 1986 has been viewed as rural economic assistance, not
enough by some, yet too much by  others. Still others argue that the
level of spending is not the issue. They believe the instruments and
provisions of today's farm programs are inappropriate.
Origin of Today's Commodity Programs
The term  "farm  programs"  is wide ranging, including everything
from  production  adjustment  and  price  support  to  import  quotas,
credit, crop insurance and export subsidy programs. The focus here is
on  "commodity  programs,"  a  more  narrow  term  usually  meaning
price  and  income  support  and production  adjustment  programs for
major  program  commodities.  The  major  program  crops  are  wheat,
rice, feed grains (corn, sorghum, barley, oats), upland cotton and soy-
beans.  The dairy program  is the major commodity  program for live-
stock.
These major commodity programs accounted for $22.7 billion (or 88
percent)  of Commodity  Credit  Corporation (CCC) spending on farm
programs in FY 1986.  The remaining commodity programs for wool,
34mohair, peanuts,  tobacco, sugar and honey accounted  for well below
$1 billion in expenditures.
Today's commodity programs  are  generally traced  to the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act (AAA) of 1933, which had as its goal the attain-
ment of "parity"-the 1909-1914 level of purchasing power-for farm
commodities.  The AAA  of 1933, along with the AAA  of 1938, intro-
duced most of the primary instruments of commodity programs used
since  then. The changing conditions in commodity markets over the
past  fifty  years  brought  refinements  in the  policy  tools  and their
levels.  Table  1 traces  the  evolution  of commodity  program  instru-
ments in relation to market conditions.
Table 1. Evolution  of Major Commodity Program Instruments
Commodity
Supply Situation
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---- -- ---,Very  early in our  nation's history,  when  80 to 90  percent  of the
population was farmers, most national economic programs were farm
programs and the correlation between farm programs and rural eco-
nomic programs was near perfect.  Even during the depression  of the
1930s,  the  then-new  commodity  programs  could  still  be  viewed  as
wide-ranging rural  assistance  programs  because  one-quarter  of the
population was farmers.  The massive  drop in commodity prices dur-
ing the depression resulted in lower incomes for much of rural Amer-
ica and formed the basis for income parity as a farm policy objective.
The 1933 act sought to raise prices by paying farmers to voluntarily
idle cropland. Direct payments, called parity payments, were made to
support  incomes.  Later,  the  1938  act  mandated  nonrecourse  loans
and introduced mandatory production controls in the form of market-
ing quotas.
Strong demand and declining stocks during and immediately after
World War II provided  the opportunity  to relax  production controls
and raise price support  levels to a rigid 90 percent  of parity.  In the
late 1940s, weaker prices and surpluses began to emerge. The  Agri-
cultural Act of 1949 introduced flexible price-support  levels between
75  and 90 percent  of parity,  depending on supply.  However,  flexible
supports did not go into effect until after the Korean  War. The  1950s
and  1960s  saw  heavy  supply  control  through the  Soil Bank and  a
resumption  of mandatory  production  controls  as well as  a focus  on
demand  expansion  through  lower  support  prices  and export  assis-
tance programs.  This was a period  of relative price stability-heavy
production control, increasingly competitive pricing and large stocks.
Some think the 1950s and 1960s were  a harbinger of the late  1980s
and early  1990s.
In the  1970s,  voluntary  "unpaid"  land  diversions,  known  as  set-
asides, became the key supply  control tool. Eligibility for  price and
income  support,  instead  of requiring  only  idling  of land, could  re-
quire  diversion.  The  earlier fixed  price-support  payments  were  re-
placed  by  deficiency  payments,  based  on  the  difference  between
established target prices and market prices.  The shortages and high
market prices in the 1970s resulted in a market-oriented  agriculture
with limited supply  controls  and small  government payments.  The
environment provided the opportunity, as did World  War  II, to raise
farm  price  supports  and  increase  the  rigidity  of  program  instru-
ments, as evidenced  in the 1981  farm bill.
In  the  early  1980s,  export  markets  eroded,  surpluses  and  farm
bankruptcies  increased  and  program  spending  skyrocketed.  The
1985  farm  bill  moved  to  restore  global  price competitiveness  with
lower, market-oriented  loan rates, marketing loans and export subsi-
dies  and  to  reduce  production  with  acreage  reduction  programs
(ARPs), paid acreage  diversion  and retirement of erodible  land. Tar-
get prices  were  reduced  slightly to  limit overproduction  incentives
and reduce  program costs. Policy changes of the 1980s are very remi-
36niscent of those of the 1960s: greater government  control on the sup-
ply side,  and market-price  orientation  and export  assistance on the
demand side.
Farm Program Effects  and Limitations
Volumes have been written about the economic effects of fifty years
of farm programs.  This  section  surveys  farm sector  effects  of farm
programs,  including  some  of  their  limitations,  and  observations
about farm policy and the underlying trends realized irrespective  of
farm policy.
1. Farm prices greater than market prices (such as today's target
prices or 1950s loan rates) lead to production in excess of demand at
the price  support level. Consequently,  total and  government-owned
stocks build, program costs rise and acreage  reduction programs are
needed to limit federal outlays.  Clear evidence is offered by the expe-
riences of the 1950s, 1960s,  late 1970s and early 1980s.
2.  Farm programs  and production  costs are interrelated.  Acreage
reduction programs  (ARP's, set-asides,  quotas,  etc.) tend to be  cost-
increasing because, with the farm production plant operating at less
than full capacity, fixed costs are spread over fewer acres.  Moreover,
there is always pressure  to increase price  and income support levels
in response to changes in production costs.  Government-guaranteed
returns above market  levels lead to higher land prices  and produc-
tion costs and, in turn, to greater pressure to adjust support levels in
a never-ending cycle.
3.  The  effect of high target prices  on production capacity  may be
obscured in the short run because target prices are, in part, compen-
sation for idling acreage.  However,  as long as the criteria for receiv-
ing  payments  per  unit  of output  is  in any way  dependent  on  the
quantity  produced,  long-run production capacity  will be higher be-
cause  the  payment  incentive  will  elicit  a  response.  Because  the
problem-causing  policy instruments are revised only after a lag, new
offsetting instruments are often implemented.  ARPs are an example:
they  are  favored  because  they  recapture  for taxpayers  part  of the
problem-causing  subsidy.  Unfortunately,  policy  instruments  often
"buy out" rather than recapture  the subsidy,  thereby compounding
the program cost.  The dairy termination  and the recent corn bonus
conservation  reserve  programs  are  examples.  In effect,  the  govern-
ment bids against itself.
4.  Price supports above market-clearing prices reduce demand and
raise surpluses.  High prices created by isolating government  stocks
cause effects especially  on the export side that are easy to underesti-
mate.  Foreign production  is encouraged by the  U.S. price/risk  um-
brella and the increases may only emerge after a period of increased
investment  in foreign  agriculture.  Tobacco  and  sugar-product  im-
37ports are  historical  examples and the current  soybean market may
offer a future example.
Our mature domestic  market and  secular yield increases  for pro-
gram crops  dictate  export dependency  if the U.S.  land base is to be
fully  utilized.  But,  the elasticity  of export  demand  greatly exceeds
that of domestic  demand,  so high price supports cause  a faster and
larger loss in export markets.  The symptom is often misdiagnosed as
a problem and export subsidies are prescribed.
Our inability to fully measure the effects of policy distortions stems
from  underestimating  the full range  of adjustments  the distortions
cause:  foreign  supply response  for the crop,  substitute product  pro-
duction response, demand response for the crop and demand response
to substitute crops and processed products.
European  Community  (EC)  consumption  of nongrain  feeds in  re-
sponse  to high feed grain prices is an example. As the deviation be-
tween  actual  prices  and  market  clearing  prices  increases,  the
historical  data  and institutional  structure  underlying  past  experi-
ence  breaks  down.  Under  these  conditions,  historical  relationships
are  inadequate  for  forecasting  future  events.  Historical  analysis
could not have accurately predicted EC sugar-containing product im-
ports or cassava or citrus pellet imports. Economists  often underesti-
mate the effect of policy distortions because, by relying on past data
to forecast future events, the ability of markets to adapt and change
is overlooked.
5.  Commodity programs  do not change the long-run rate of return
to labor, capital and land (Johnson).  Programs that raise farm prices
above  market  price levels attract mobile  resources  into agriculture,
but because  there are no barriers to entry and resource supplies are
elastic, returns per unit of resource change little. Land, fixed in sup-
ply,  has its price bid up to reflect the increase  in future income  to
land generated by the commodity  programs.  Land prices rise to the
point at which  the  income  rate of return  to land  is comparable  to
nonfarm investments  of similar risk. Thus, programs tend to create
wealth for current landowners.  Pressure to maintain wealth is a key
reason it is so difficult  to reduce target prices  and loan rates when
market prices fall below them, and why offsetting compensatory  in-
struments are used (See point 3).
6.  Farm programs  are  a  series  of short-run  policies  in pursuit of
changing markets established to cushion the structural  adjustments
in agriculture.  Farm programs  cannot  alter long-run market funda-
mentals. For example, the inflexible policy tools of the 1940s,  1950s,
late 1970s and early 1980s prevented adjustment to a declining mar-
ket.  As  the  secular  and  program-induced  trend toward  lower  real
prices  continued,  government  intervention  and  program  costs  be-
came ever-increasing.  Programs then  catch  the market  only  under
drought or unexpected export demand surges. These bliss points have
38proven  short-lived  (1980,  1983)  and  as prices  decline  and  program
costs  recover and mount,  program instruments  are revised to chase
the market. Valiant attempts are also made to disguise the program
costs by shifting them to other sectors of the economy.
7.  The  distribution  of  commodity  program  benefits  is  highly
skewed-most benefits go to a relatively small number of larger-than-
average  farms.  History,  inertia,  precedent  and  politics-not
economics-explain  why  some  commodities are  regulated  and some
are not.
Looking  at program  crop producers,  Table  2  shows the pattern of
1985  crop deficiency and diversion payments by base acreage. Farms
with  300  base  acres  or  less  accounted  for  86 percent  of farms  re-
ceiving payments  and received  51  percent  of the payments.  The  2
percent of farms with more than 1,000 base acres received  14 percent
of payments.
Table 2. Distribution of Direct Commodity Payments, 1985 Cropsl
Total crop base  Share of  Share of  Payment
acres of farms  payments  farms  per farm
-percent-  dollars
.1 to 40  3.0  20.9  975
40.1 to 300  47.7  65.4  4,975
300.1  to 700  27.0  10.3  17,885
700.1  to 1,000  8.4  1.7  32,655
1,000 to 2,000  9.8  1.4  49,365
2,000.1+  4.1  .3  93,045
100.0  100.0
1ASCS data for farms receiving payments; include deficiency  and diversion; farms are ASCS farms;
farm numbers and  payments made to farms with unknown base acreages are excluded.
Table  3 provides more  detail for the  1985 calendar year  from the
USDA's Farm Costs and Returns Survey (FCRS), including farm pro-
gram  payments  by  sales rather  than base  acres  (Harrington;  Lee).
The  skewness is much more pronounced  when nonrecipients of pay-
ments are  considered-with only 34  percent  of U.S.  farms receiving
payments,  a mere 13 percent of all U.S. farms received 74 percent of
total  payments.  Although  payments  per farm rise  as farm  size  in-
creases,  payments  to  moderate-sized  farms accounted  for  a larger
share of gross income than for large or small-sized farms. Payments
were concentrated  among grain  farms  and 58 percent  of payments
went to the Lake States, Corn Belt and Northern Plains. Because of
high payment  rates under the cotton  and rice programs,  payments
per farm were highest in the Delta.
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.4 18.  Most  program  payments  are  not  made  to  financially-stressed
farmers.  The 1985  FCRS data indicate only 16  percent of payments
went  to  seriously  financially  stressed  farms-those  with  negative
cash flow (after deducting an allowance for living expenses and add-
ing  nonfarm  income)  and  debt/asset  ratios  above  .4  (Harrington).
More than 40 percent  of payments went to farms with positive cash
flows and debts below 40 percent of assets, farms that hardly can be
considered financially stressed.
9.  Public perceptions run behind the structural changes that occur
in  agriculture  irrespective  of  commodity  programs.  This  leads  to
myths that become the foundations  for policy "solutions"
Part of the problem is that the income, wealth and structural char-
acteristics of agriculture are diverse within the sector.  Policy makers
tend to make programs on the basis of a small group of most finan-
cially  distressed  farmers  rather  than  looking  at  the  income  and
wealth position of the overall sector.
On the one hand, the inelasticity  of food demand,  production tech-
nology, economies  of size and consolidation  of farms in search  of in-
come parity have reduced farm numbers and increased average  farm
sizes and the trend will increase  in the future.  On the  other hand,
current  commodity programs  seemingly  aim to stem the  outmigra-
tion and preserve  structure.
This summer, congressional  policy debates over how to cut agricul-
tural spending by $1.2 billion in FY  1988 have usually been accom-
panied  by  the  statement,  "We'll  consider  it as  long  as  it doesn't
reduce farm income."  Policy  makers tend to ignore the wealth  and
farm income  position  of all farmers,  the rapid  growth  in their  off-
farm earnings and average incomes and wealth relative to nonfarm
families.
10.  Farm sector problems that motivate farm program changes are
compounded by macroeconomic  events. This further limits the ability
of farm program changes to "solve"  farm sector problems. For exam-
ple, at least one analyst presents a convincing case that virtually the
entire  asset  value  loss  in  agriculture  since  1981  has been  due  to
changing  real  interest  rates  (Prentice).  Changing  exchange  rates
hastened the inappropriateness of fixed loan rates in the early 1980s.
Another  example is found in the structural adjustment  in the non-
farm sector. In the  1950s, real net cash farm income was stable, yet
farm numbers fell by  1.5 million as the nonfarm sector offered eco-
nomic  opportunity.  The rural  farm problem  of the  1980s  has been
compounded by the tremendous job losses of the energy industry and
import-competing manufacturing (Table 4). Off-farm employment  op-
portunities  have been limited in many areas increasing the adjust-
ment costs for dislocated farmers.
41Table 4. Farm and Nonfarm  Employment  Changes
Change  in employment
Period  Change in  Agri-  Mining  Textiles  Primary, fabricated  Transportation
farm  culture  (inc. oil  metal and  machines
numbers  extraction)  (excl. electrical)
1971-80  -469,000  - 30,000  +418,000  -186,000  +783,000  +139,000
1981-86  -220,000  -205,000  -347,000  -243,000  -922,000  + 87,000
Commodity  Programs and Rural Economy  Linkages
Farm-Nonfarm Economic  Bonds
How  commodity  programs  affect  rural  economies  depends  on the
size and geographical  distribution  of the farm sector and its links to
the nonfarm sector. Farm production  is but one part of the total food
and fiber sector that also  includes upstream  industries that supply
inputs to farming  and downstream  manufacturing  and distribution
industries.  The  food and fiber sector  accounts for 18  percent of U.S.
gross  national  product  (GNP)  and  19  percent  of total  employment
(Lee,  et  al.).  The  farm  production  sector,  however,  makes  up  only
about  2  percent  of GNP  and employment,  about the  same  as  the
input industries. The downstream sector is the largest  source of eco-
nomic activity and employment, accounting  for about 14 percent.
Reflecting the industrialization  of the United  States, the food and
fiber sector has declined  in relative  importance  over time. In 1930,
farm production accounted for about 8 percent of GNP and 25 percent
of the labor force, about  five times greater than  now.  In 1947, total
food  and fiber  sector employment  was 41  percent  of the  U.S.  labor
force,  more  than  twice  the  current  share.  And  the food  and  fiber
system's  share  of GNP  has dropped about 15  percent over the past
decade.
The farm sector, although small compared to U.S. GNP and employ-
ment,  is linked  closely  to the  rest of the  economy  and  changes  in
farm output can affect the national economy.  In the simplest terms,
an increase in demand for  farm products raises farm prices and in-
comes  which,  in turn,  leads  to  increased  spending  by farmers  for
consumer  and capital  goods.  This increased  spending  is multiplied
throughout the economy to bring higher overall  levels of production,
income and employment.
For  example,  aggregate  demand  multipliers  derived  from  input-
output analysis are about 2 to 1 for most goods and services produced
in the economy, including agricultural commodities.  This means that
each $1 billion of additional demand for raw farm commodities  such
as wheat or feed grains brings about $2 billion in additional GNP. At
1982  levels this would  be  likely  to generate  30,000  to 35,000  jobs
annually.
42Increased  aggregate  demand  can lead to increases  in overall  out-
put,  income  and  employment.  However,  increases  in  farm  income
caused by cutbacks in the sector's output can reduce overall economic
output  and employment.  Acreage  reduction  programs,  for example,
reduce the demand for production inputs and may reduce the volume
of production flowing through manufacturing and distribution indus-
tries. A  small acreage  reduction program would have little effect  on
overall  GNP and  employment,  with  most of the losses  in  the farm
sector  and input industries. USDA's analysis  of the 1986 ARPs indi-
cated that  each  10  million acres  of land  idled-with  little effect  on
prices due to current surpluses-caused a drop in sales of seed,  chem-
icals  and energy inputs of $1 billion (USDA  1986b).  In contrast, an-
other  study  has  shown  that  a  much  larger  acreage  reduction
program, restricting commodity  sales to the point at which commod-
ity prices could be raised to 80 percent  of parity, would idle roughly
50 percent of the program acreage base (Harrington, et al.). The com-
bination of sharply reduced input purchases and lower domestic  and
export  demand would reduce GNP by  $64 billion-$12 billion in up-
stream  industries,  $18 billion in the farm sector and $35  billion in
manufacturing  and  distribution.  Employment  losses of 2.1  million
jobs  would  be  about  10  percent  of  the  food  and  fiber  sector's
employment.
Farm-Rural Economy  Bonds
Despite its national  importance, the food and fiber sector provides
only about 31 percent of the jobs in all nonmetro areas, ranging from
37  percent  in the Northern  Plains  to 24 percent  in the  Northeast.
Moreover, only about one third of total food and fiber sector jobs were
in nonmetro areas in 1982  (Petrulis, et al.).
By industry, about 65 percent of farm employment was in nonmetro
areas,  48  percent  of input industry  jobs,  34 percent  of processing
(higher for textiles and lower for food processing) and marketing em-
ployment,  and only  18 percent  of wholesaling  and retailing jobs.  A
preliminary  analysis  of 1984  data under a  slightly different  indus-
trial  aggregation  shows the nonmetro  share  of total  food  and fiber
employment at 27 percent (Table 5).
By region, the Delta States and the Northern Plains accounted  for
the  highest  nonmetro  concentrations  of total  food  and  fiber  sector
employment in 1982 at 60 and 71 percent, compared to a low of about
12  percent  in the Northeast  and  Pacific  nonmetro  regions.  Within
each  industry category, nonmetro shares of food and fiber sector em-
ployment  ranged  widely:  farm  sector,  91  percent  in  the  Northern
Plains to 29 percent in the Pacific; inputs, 75 percent in the Northern
Plains to  22  percent  in the  Pacific;  processing  and  marketing,  71
percent  in the Delta to 7 percent in the Pacific;  and wholesaling and
retailing,  50  percent  in the  Northern  Plains  to  8  percent  in  the
Pacific.
43Table 5. Metro-Nonmetro  Share of Employment: Selected  Industries in the U.S.  Food and
Fiber System,  19841
Sector  Metro  Nonmetro
-percent-
Farm  31  69
Food Processing  71  29
Textile Manufacturing  60  40
Other Manufacturing  79  21
Other Sectors  82  18
Trade  83  17
Transportation  85  15
Eating and Drinking  83  17
Total Food &  Fiber  73  27
'Preliminary  estimates provided by Gerald Schluter,  ERS,  USDA.
Among rural communities, it is clear that the economic importance
of the farm  sector and its linked upstream  and  downstream  indus-
tries varies  widely.  However,  commodity  policies  have  the greatest
economic impacts in those rural areas in which farming is the major
source  of economic  activity.  Of 2,443 nonmetro  U.S.  counties, there
are  702  farm-dependent  counties  in  which  farm-related  earnings
were at least 20 percent of all  county earnings  during  1975-79.  In
1950, there were more than 2,000 farm-dependent counties.
Obviously, with farming remaining a dominant source of economic
activity  in fewer than one-third  of all rural counties,  an industrial
transformation  has  taken  place  in  rural  America.  These  farm-
dependent counties are much more dependent on commodity support
programs  than  other  rural  counties.  In farm-  dependent  counties,
upstream and downstream  sectors are very dependent upon the eco-
nomic health and the level of output of the farm  sector. Among these
farm-dependent  counties, there are  173  export-dependent  counties-
those  that  have  50  percent  or  more  of their  farm  sales  from  the
export-oriented  crops of corn, soybeans, wheat,  cotton and rice.  This
is approximately  5  percent of all U.S.  counties that are  both farm-




The  1985  farm  bill negotiations  confronted  four  major  problems:
rising  program  costs,  farm  financial  stress,  loss  of export  markets
and  growing surpluses.  Although  macroeconomic  and other factors
44contributed,  legislators  recognized  that these  four  problems  could
only be  compounded  by  commodity  program  instruments that fur-
ther drive  supply  and demand  for market  reality.  As  a result,  the
1985 act  provides a set of consistent tools to achieve a long-run ad-
justment to market forces. The primary objectives are to: (1) promote
market price competitiveness  and thereby  restore demand; (2) phase
down income  supports to reduce program outlays and limit overpro-
duction  incentives;  (3) protect farm  income  during the adjustment;
and  (4)  utilize  supply  control to  reduce  excess  supplies  and retire
erodible  land.
It is important to understand two critical aspects of the 1985 farm
bill: (1) The authorized program instruments start agriculture down
a road that ultimately  ends with demand,  production  and farm in-
come  being determined in a deregulated  marketplace.  (2) The  effec-
tiveness  of  the  program  instruments  should  be  judged  in
combination, not separately,  because their functions are complemen-
tary. This second point deserves elaboration because singling out pro-
gram instruments and their effects  can offer ambiguous evidence  of
both program  success and failure.
One  analyst,  recently  summarizing  1986's large program  outlays
and idled acreages,  said, "Agriculture  is the area  in which federal
policy has deteriorated  most drastically  since the Reagan-Bush  ad-
ministration took office"  (Bovard, p.  16).  Costs have been  large  and
one  could reasonably argue for a more rapid adjustment.  Neverthe-
less, Bovard's view fails to recognize  any strategy in the 1985 act.  A
summary  of key  program  provisions  and their  outcomes  identifies
that strategy.
* Price supports have been tied to market prices and lowered dras-
tically through so-called Findley cuts or virtually eliminated (cotton
and rice) by marketing loans that allow repayment at market prices
when prices  are below  loan rates. Total agricultural  exports are re-
sponding to improved  price  competitiveness.  Volume  is expected  to
rise to 129 million tons in fiscal 1987, up 18 percent for the first rise
in seven years.  Domestic use  is equally impressive.  Compared  with
1985-86, corn use in 1987-88 is expected to be up 12 percent; cotton
up  14 percent; rice  up 22 percent and  soybean crush up  14 percent.
Only  wheat  is expected  to  decline  because  of lower  feed  use.  The
strategy is to stop supporting global prices and foreign producers, let
prices  reflect  supply/demand  balance,  recognize  export dependency
and compete for export share.
*  Target  prices  are  reduced  over  the  life  of  the  bill.  However,
the reductions have been more than offset  by unanticipated  produc-
tion cost declines. The target price reductions are the first since tar-
get  prices  were  introduced  in  the  1973  act.  Nevertheless,  target
prices remain well above full economic costs of producing major crops
(Table  6).
45Table 6. Production Costs  and Alternative  Farm Prices for Major Crops, 1987 Crop Year
Upland
Item  Wheat  Rice  Corn  Cotton
$/bu.  $/cwt.  $/bu.  $/lb.
Full economic cost of production  3.50  7.40  2.05  .63
Target price  4.38  11.66  3.03  .794
80% of parity price'  5.45  15.36  3.95  1.02
Effective target price
2 3.42  9.13  2.61  .68
Deficiency  payments  have  been  separated from  actual  yields and
the permitted growth in payment bases has been slowed.  These are
steps in the direction of separating the production incentive from the
federal payment. Program cost is a direct result of fixed target prices
and lower loan rates.  Increased cost  exposure  was a strategy  of the
1985 act-both  designed  and anticipated.  It is the  adjustment  cost
associated with instant price competitiveness.
* Supply  control  continues  to be  forced  by  too-high target prices
and  the  government  guarantees  to  be  a  home  for  surpluses.  The
strategy for  eventual  elimination  of annual programs  is through  a
combination  of expanded  demand under  competitive  market prices,
reduction  of excess  capacity  as the  conservation  reserve  expands,
higher prices as supply/demand balance  improves and target  prices
reflecting market prices. The latter is unlikely to occur without sub-
sequent legislation,  suggesting that ARPs will  be around for a long
time.
* Commodity certificate  payments and in-kind export subsidies are
key parts of the price-competitiveness  strategy. Probably costing 5 to
10 percent  of their face value, certificates  augment free supplies and
permit sales at prices below rigid minimum loan rates for grain (Col-
lins  et al.).  Certificates  will  be  critical  to  accessing  current  huge
farmer-owned reserve and CCC-owned stocks at competitive prices as
overall  surpluses fall. Without  certificates,  a market  shock  such as
that in  1983 could  be recreated-artificially  high market prices in-
duced by large acreage  reduction programs and no market liquidity.
Mandatory Production Controls
The consequences  of rejecting the current policy road and shifting
to mandatory production controls have been thoroughly documented
in history and in recent analysis. An early USDA study of one  such
lEighty percent of August  1987 parity prices.
2Market  price  needed  on  production  from full  base  acreage to  equal  net return  from  receiving
target  price  on  acreage  reduced  by acreage  reduction requirement.  Not  comparable  to full eco-
nomic cost of production because fixed costs are raised to reflect 1987 acreage reduction programs.
46bill  demonstrated  the  following  effects:  arbitrary  political  pricing
based on parity prices, which are irrelevant to income parity; loss of
exports or excessive export subsidies; loss of domestic demand due to
substitutes  and processed  imports; decimation  of the livestock  and
poultry sectors;  loss of input industry sales; increased inefficiency  in
production;  large  increases  in consumer  costs;  inability  to  control
surpluses because of demand losses and limits on acreage  idled; and
no reduction  in  government  costs  because  of export  subsidies  and
loan outlays on surpluses. Attempts to shift budget costs of taxpayers
to consumers fail. Program history has taught that such rigid devia-
tions from the market ultimately will fail.
Three of the effects of mandatory controls are especially interesting
because they are disbelieved or not understood. First, mandatory con-
trols and parity prices represent  a government-sponsored  monopoly
with  monopoly  profits  being  distributed  among  farmers.  Table  6
clearly demonstrates  the extent of the monopoly  profits (as well as
the rents the average  producer  is earning under current programs).
The high parity-based prices are justified by being those that would
restore  cash flow to the group  of most severely  financially  stressed
farmers,  irrespective  of what other excess profits  are transferred  to
other farmers.  Second, the program replaces the progressive income
tax financing of farm programs with regressive food taxes-yet, the
program finds supporters in leaders of low-income  groups that would
be hardest hit. Third, the potential  for displacing off-farm  food  and
fiber  sector  workers  is greater for this program  than probably any
other. Even so, the program  is strongly supported by a major manu-
facturing industry labor union.
Greater Market Orientation
Another set of options would reduce government support and make
farmers more dependent on market forces. Domestic  policy reform is
an objective of many nations that incur large farm support costs and
are harmed  in international  markets by domestic  agricultural  poli-
cies. In Geneva on July 6, the United States proposed to the General
Agreement  on Tariffs and Trade  (GATT) that by  the year 2000  na-
tions eliminate  all subsidies  that distort  trade.  The  U.S.  proposal
would permit income transfers that are not trade distorting.
Current commodity  policy, as discussed,  gradually moves toward a
greater market orientation through  1990. While  the federal  govern-
ment  is heavily involved in agriculture, the continuation  of current
policy beyond 1990 would lead to less government intervention  and
smaller taxpayer costs.  The policy changes set in place  by the 1985
farm bill could be accelerated.  In practical terms, this would mean:
(1)  a faster rate of reduction in target prices, which would lower the
level of income support; (2) authority for the Secretary of Agriculture
47to reduce  support  prices  by more  than is  now  allowed;  (3)  smaller
acreage reduction requirements;  and (4) no requirement to plant pro-
gram crops in order to receive payments.
An  alternative  to the  current  policy  path  is  a  move  to  a  more
market-oriented agriculture.  One approach is the "decoupling" of in-
come  support from production.  The  concept  is that income transfers
to farmers should be production neutral; that is, transfers should not
be tied to current production or affect production. One could conceive
of income transfers having wide-ranging production effects. Freezing
program payment yields, as done in the 1985 farm bill, reduces the
incentive  to increase  yields  for program  payments.  This  marginal
dilution  of the  production-payment  link  may  be at  one end  of the
spectrum. At the other end, fixed payments could be made to farmers
irrespective  of what they  produce  or whether  they  even remain  in
farming. Beyond this conceptual  range,  however, there  are differing
views  as  to  what  decoupling  might  mean  in terms  of commodity
policy.
A  widely-held  view  of  decoupling  is  reflected  in  Senator  Bos-
chwitz's  1987  draft legislation  covering  1990-1995  crops.  Existing
holders of commodity  base  acreages  would receive  declining annual
payments  computed  on  their  1989  base  acreages  regardless  of
whether  they  grew  any  program  crops.  Payments  would  be  made
through  1995, but at a lower level than in 1990. Support prices would
continue to be set in relation to market prices as under current pol-
icy, but would  likely be lower.  Acreage reduction programs would be
eliminated  and authority  to plant nonprogram  crops  on base  acres
would be phased in. Under this approach,  decoupling  is a transition
policy to allow  farmers  to adjust to incomes  determined  by market
conditions.
Decoupled income support, however, could be a permanent  policy to
provide  income  transfers  to  farmers.  On  the  one  hand,  payments
could be made to existing base holders. On the other, income support
could be targeted to farmers based on need as determined by a means
test. Certainly, a means-tested income maintenance program for U.S.
farmers would  be a fundamental  policy  change.  Decoupling  income
support  would  probably  intensify  the  debate  as  to  why  farmers
should receive  income transfers.  A means-tested  income support  ex-
clusively  for farmers would be even more  contentious  for farmers  as
well as for other groups.
The  consequences  of  more  market-oriented  commodity  policies
would  be  determined by the  specific  types  of policies  and a host  of
other factors. For example,  an acceleration  of changes in the current
policy path would reduce  income transfers to crop producers  and in-
crease  the production  of program  crops.  Most likely,  crop  producers
would  be  worse  off,  at least  in the  intermediate  term,  because  of
lower  (effective)  farm  prices.  To  the  extent  that farm  asset  values
reflect  the expectation of income  streams based on current policy,  a
48reduction  in  expected  income  streams  would  reduce  asset  values.
Consumers  would not be affected much and taxpayers would benefit.
These consequences  reflect the general  direction  of impacts;  how-
ever, two important factors would affect the results  of more market-
oriented policies. The first is market price changes. A priori,  incomes
would fall if smaller income transfers were not offset by higher prices
and/or increased  production.  Price  changes  for grains,  oilseeds and
cotton would  be strongly  influenced  by exportable  supplies  and de-
mand in international markets. There is a general expectation that a
coordinated,  multilateral reduction in domestic support levels would
lead to higher world market prices for most commodities.  Thus, U.S.
crop producers would eventually receive higher  market prices if do-
mestic policies were reformed. Nevertheless,  U.S. producers  now re-
ceive  effective prices that are well above current market prices.  For
example, participating wheat producers receive an effective price, ad-
justed for supply control programs, of about $3.42 per bushel on their
total base  acreages, compared to a market price of $2.50 per bushel
(Table 6).
A second consideration is the extent to which other forms of income
support would be substituted for current payments. Realistically, it is
unlikely that payments can be substantially reduced, let alone elimi-
nated, unless the  income losses  to producers  are partially  offset by
higher  market  prices and/or  other income  transfers  such  as decou-
pled  income  support.  If so,  then  alternative  income  support is  an
important issue.
Decoupled income  support as proposed by Senator Boschwitz would
make payments to farmers who  now have base acreages.  Depending
on payment rates, the level of income transfers could decline as com-
pared to current policy. Even so, the distribution would remain about
the same. In contrast, a means-tested income support program could
change both the level and distribution of income transfers. For exam-
ple,  income  support  might be  given  only  to financially  vulnerable
farms  (negative  cash flows  and high  debt-to-asset  ratios).  Based  on
1986 data, about 200,000  farms would be eligible;  about 60 percent
have  annual  sales  less  than $40,000  and 20  percent  have  sales  of
$40,000 to $99,999.  Thus, the distribution  of income  support would
change, mostly to farms with less than $100,000 in sales. Now about
a third of government payments are  made to such farms.
Implications for Rural Revitalization
How  alternative  commodity  policies might  affect rural  communi-
ties is complex.  Farming has strong linkages to sectors that supply
its inputs and handle its products. As a result, local, regional and the
national economies  can be  affected  in the short run by changes in
commodity  programs.  However,  the  farm-rural-general  economic
49linkages have weakened  over time as farming has declined and non-
farming industries have  grown. In general,  the Delta, the Northern
and Southern  Plains  and the Corn  Belt are  most sensitive to farm
policy changes.  The farm sector would be most  affected in the farm-
dependent areas.  Specifically,  those 173 rural counties that are both
farm-dependent  and  export-crop  dependent  would  probably  be
affected most by policy-induced  changes in farm prices, incomes and
production.  In  these  regions,  cash  grain  and  cotton  farms  are
dominant.
To help examine the effects of alternative  policies,  Table 7 presents
the results of an econometric analysis of decoupling wheat payments,
mandatory  controls  for wheat as proposed  by Harkin-Gephardt  and
continuation  of the  1985  act  with  declining  target  prices through
1995.  As compared  to current policy,  both options raise net returns
above cash expenses with the largest income gain to wheat producers
from mandatory  controls.
Table  7.  Wheat:  Mandatory  Production  Controls  and  Decoupling  Compared  with
Continuation of Current  Law, 1990-95 Crop Year Totals'
Mandatory
Item  Controls  Decoupling
-Difference  from current law-
Acreage  planted (mil. ac.)  -62.0  +52.0
Exports (bil. bu.)  - 1.3  +  .9
Consumer expenditures  (bil. dol.)
(farm level)  +15.2  - 1.5
Net cash returns (bil. dol.)2  +28.7  + 6.9
Program cost (bil.  dol.)  +13.5  + 8.7
Under  mandatory  controls,  wheat-planted  acreage  during  the
1990-95 period would total more than 60 million acres less compared
to current policy.  In contrast,  decoupling  would result in a  substan-
tial increase  in both planted  acreage  and input use as idled land is
returned to production.  Under mandatory  controls,  upstream indus-
tries would be harmed by a $3 billion loss in sales to wheat producers
for the 1990-95 period which would impair rural communities,  espe-
cially communities  like those in the Northern Plains where  a large
share of input industry jobs are in nonmetro  areas.
In terms of downstream  economic  activity, lower prices as a result
of decoupling  lead to a larger volume  of wheat  exports and domestic
1Econometric  simulation with all programs starting in  1990 crop year. Current programs  assume
an annual reduction  in target price of 3.85 percent through  1995, minimum permitted or formula
loan  rates,  and a  27.5 ARP  in  each year.  Mandatory  controls  is  the  Harkin-Gephardt  bill  as
submitted in the 100th Congress.  ARPs are held at maximum permitted level with in-kind  subsi-
dies used to the maximum extent possible to maintain exports. Loan rates start at 70 percent of
parity in 1990 and rise 1 point each year thereafter to 80 percent. Decoupling  eliminates target
prices and sets the loan rate at $1.60 per bushel.  The transition payment is $1.35  bushel in 1990
and drops about  10 percent a year thereafter. The payment is made regardless  of market price.
2Returns above  variable cash  production  expenses.
50use while much higher prices under mandatory controls cause use to
fall. Under mandatory controls exports could have been kept equal to
current  programs  by  using  smaller  ARPs;  however,  program  costs
would have been greater.  The gains or losses in downstream employ-
ment  and output would  have the most effect  on rural  communities
such as those in the Delta and Northern Plains regions where a high
proportion of downstream jobs are in nonmetro  areas.
Under  decoupling,  with its lower  prices,  consumers fare better as
compared to current policy while they would spend about $15 billion
more  at the farm  level  during  1990-95  because  of mandatory  con-
trols.  Taxpayers  pay  more  under  both  options.  Decoupling  outlays
rise because transition payments are made regardless  of rising mar-
ket prices that reduce payments under current policy. Under manda-
tory  controls,  in-kind  export  subsidies  paid  from  stocks  displace
production and cause large loan outlays. The sum of the program cost
increases  and consumer cost changes  about  equal the farm  income
change under both options.
These examples for wheat suggest a mixed bag of results for rural
communities.  Wheat  producers  would have  more  income  to  spend,
but in the case  of mandatory controls,  the contraction  in wheat pro-
duction would harm other businesses in rural communities. Further,
as consumers and taxpayers, rural citizens would spend more of their
incomes to support wheat producers under mandatory controls.
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